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Incentives in Corporate Governance: 











Corporate  governance  stems  from  the  interplay  of  legal  norms,  security 
regulation, self-regulation and best practices.  Recent scandals and frauds have 
forced  governments  to  update  laws  on  corporate  governance:  the  legislation 
process has been very fast in some countries, others have lagged. 
Law and regulation intervene and become effective only ex-post, when damages 
have been done and malpractice is self-evident. On the contrary, self-regulation is 
a quicker and more flexible response to changing market conditions and of great 
impact on the relationship between firms and their environment.  
A  self-regulatory  organization  (SRO)  such  as  the  stock  exchange  could 
administer the screening device, based on an indicator developed on the provisions 
of the corporate governance code issued by the SRO itself. 
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1. A Perspective on Corporate Governance 
 
Corporate  governance  stems  from  the  interplay  of  legal  norms,  security 
regulation, self-regulation (including corporate governance codes and instructions 
for  listed  firms)  and  best  practices.  Recent  scandals  and  frauds  have  forced 
governments to update laws on corporate governance: the legislation process has 
been very fast in some countries, others have lagged, the final result being in any 
case an increase in the costs of mantaining a proper corporate governance system 
caused and a recess in the relevance given to existing self-regulation tools.  
The  gist  of  our  argument  is  that  law  and  regulation  intervene  and  become 
effective  only  ex-post,  when  damages  have  been  done  and  malpractice  is  self-
evident. On the contrary, self-regulation is a quicker and more flexible response to 
changing  market  conditions  (IOSCO  2002:  12)  and  of  great  impact  on  the 
relationship between firms and their environment (Golinelli, Gatti 2000-1: par. 3); 
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it  could  help  investors  to  discriminate  bad  from  good  cases  of  corporate 
governance and it is an incentive-based tool for firms to screen themselves 
In  section  1  we  suggest  that  in  order  to  foster  accountability  by  managers,  a 
screening device should be build up so that firms have an incentive in revealing their 
technological  expertise  and  managerial  competences  in  corporate  governance, 
including  disclosure  and  transparency,  mostly  through  a  corporate  governance 
Report.  A  self-regulatory  organization  (SRO)  such  as  the  stock  exchange  could 
administer  the  screening  device,  based  on  an  indicator  developed  not  only  after 
corporate law and securities regulation but also on the provisions of the corporate 
governance code issued by the SRO itself. Section 2 is devoted to outline such a 
quality  indicator  for  Italy,  referred  to  the  corporate  governance  code  by  Borsa 
Italiana, according to which we obtain a finer rating system. Some brief remarks on 
further improvements of the indicator close the paper. 
 
 
2. The Theoretical Argument 
 
Corporate governance is intermingled with the question of whether the firm is 
managed in the interests of shareholders or stakeholders (Tirole 1999). It is mostly 
concerned on aligning decisions and behaviour of the manager to aims and welfare 
improvement  of  shareholders,  and  consequently  on  performance  and  value 
creation; the relevance of corporate governance as a predictor of good performance 
is well established
1.  
The institutional frame of a country, even its legal origins matter: the relevance 
given  to  investor  protection  and  the  efficiency  of  the  legal  system  in  fostering 
shareholder value influence performance (La Porta et al. 1998, 2001). Evidence 
points,  with  increasing  certitude,  that  corporate  control  and  its  market 
(management  turnover,  takeover  defenses  and  so  on),  performance,  capital 
structure, governance and ownership are interrelated and must be tested together 
(Bhagat, Jefferis, 2002). Along these lines, we sustain the relevance of an overall 
indicator to combine norms, rules and self-regulation in order to give a complete 
picture of corporate governance in a country. 
Agency theory holds a perspective on corporate governance as an institutional 
setting to solve problems arising from hidden information (adverse selection) and 
hidden action (moral hazard); the former is mostly concerned with the information 
on the available technology for the firm, the latter deals with the ability, skills and 
effort of the managers who conduct the business itself.  
The  principal-agent  paradigm  has  become  a  constitutive  component  of  the  new 
economics of regulation (Laffont, Tirole, 1993). In this section we draw an analogy: 
we consider any listed firm as if it were a public utility providing a peculiar added 
service to financial market: accountability and compliance. In this setting the regulator 
is  loosely  defined  and  represented  as  a  plethora  of  institutions:  legislative  branch, 
government, security regulator, SRO (such as the stock exchange), all of them acting 
as a delegates by the market (investors, analysts, and so on).  
From this perspective corporate governance is myopically biased towards reducing 
moral  hazard  problems,  while  those  arising  from  adverse  selection  are  mostly 
neglected. On the  contrary, adverse selection plays  a two-fold important role: in 
stock-picking and portfolio formation, due to the need to discriminate between good 
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informational rent appropriated by the firm, thus asking for the introduction of an 
incentive scheme to induce firm to give up part of this rent. This is why we devote 
our attention to information disclosure aspects of corporate governance, considered 
as proxy for the care managers devote to accountability and compliance; the gist of 
our argument is that more attention to informational rent extraction (by the regulator) 
is requested in order to discriminate the bad firm form the good one. In this section 
we  first  draw  attention  on  the  price  mechanism  (subsection  2.1)  and  then  on 
regulation (subsection 2.2). 
 
2.1 Corporate Governance and Price Formation 
 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  corporate  governance  is  also  aimed  at  establishing  an 
efficient monitoring (and accounting) structure to reveal the quality of managers in 
the  business.  They  have  hidden  information  on  ‘technology  or  productivity 
parameters’ that generate the market value of the firm: information is needed by 
the financial community on these parameters that generate the cash flows of the 
firm. By communicating to the financial community they can (cautiously) release 
information  on  these,  thus  influencing  the  pattern  of  price  formation  (i.e.,  the 
probability  density  function  of  stock  prices).  Information  on  private  knowledge 
regarding productivity parameters cannot be easily disclosed for strategic reasons, 
so  we  can  use  a  proxy,  i.e.,  the  overall  communication  policy  of  the  firm 
(disclosure and transparency).  
Managers also reveal their competence in the process of communicating strategy, 
earnings  prospects  and  investment  plans  (for  assets  in  place  and  for  growth 
opportunities of the firm), and in building up reputation and credibility through this 
signalling process, by doing so they screen themselves in matters of disclosure and 
compliance.  It  is  the  willingness-to-disclose  by  the  firm  which  defines  its  type: 
whether it a good or a bad one in accountability and transparency. The available 
technology of disclosure of the firm is considered to be driven by law and regulation 
(which are well known to all the participants in the financial markets), but each firm 
must distinguish itself from the others and must have some instruments to show off 
its characteristics; we think corporate governance codes help as a screening device. 
In  this  regard,  yardstick  competition  refers  to  the  comparison  among  firms 
according  to  the  characteristics  of  their  ‘information-on-the-firm  production 
function’  (i.e.,  the  production  function  of  the  communication  and  disclosure 
process  itself),  which  concerns  the  revelation  by  the  manager  of  his  hidden 
knowledge on the strategy of the firm, and this is the extra public service listed 
firms have to provide to the market
2. 
Price formation depends on the interplay between macro (market-) level factors 
and micro (firm-) level ones. The latter are dealt with now, the former at the end of 
subsection 2.2. 
At a micro level, the very process of disseminating information to the market is 
driven by managers and in the end by the monitoring (and accounting) structure of 
the firm. According to Damodaran (1985) the diffusion and timing of information 
effects the valuation of firms by the market: the communication process influences 
cash flows formation as it is perceived by the financial community and translated 
into prices through time. Both the structure and dynamics of events in the firm and 
the characteristics of the information process set up by the manager fuel the data 
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securities  of  the  firm.  He  shows  (1985:  433)  that  the  information  process  is 
articulated  by  managers  along  the  following  dimensions:  the  frequency  and 
consistency in the communication (how often the signal is emitted and what is the 
time lag in the release), and the accuracy in the process (errors, omissions in the 
communication).  By  crossing  these  characteristics  and  the  frim-specific,  inner 
structure and dynamics of the events, the firm (more or less explicitly) establishes a 
policy  of  releasing  important  information  concerning  the  moments  of  its  price 
probability density function. It must not be forgotten that all of the moments of the 
distribution, including skewness and curtosis, become relevant when large risks are 
at stake. At the core of our proposal is the idea that the information process hinges on 
voluntary disclosure because it is deemed to be more significant by the financial 
community than mandatory information, which is considered as routine. 
As stated above, adverse selection models are motivated by the search for the 
revelation of manager’s private information about the technology that generates the 
cash  flow  of  the  firm  and  by  his  willingness  to  transmit  and  share  it  with  the 
financial community, a discretional policy in the hands of the manager. We suggest 
to turn also to this other side of the agency problem mentioned at the beginning of 
the section, and to replenish the picture on corporate governance for each country 
by including the institutional setting: the role of regulators, SROs (such as stock 
exchanges),  auditing  firms  and  rating  agencies,  investors  (a  broad  category  to 
include the security industry in general: institutional investors, financial analysts, 
etc.), the market for corporate control, capital and ownership structure. Table 2.1 
recapitulates what said thus far on agency problems and price formation, at micro 
and macro levels. 
 
Table 2.1: A Synopsis of Agency Problems and Their Effects in Price Formation 
 
  Agency problems   





















































Price formation   at firm-level   at market-level  
 
When hidden information problem is alleviated, the part of the cash flows of the firm 
which is diverted by the manager is reduced and the value remaining in his hands has 
the nature of informational rent. Tirole (1999: par. 2.4) shows the relevance of passive 
monitoring in measuring rather than affecting the value of assets in place, and the role 
of performance measurement in increasing (pledgeable) income. Passive monitoring 
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cake’  that  needs  to  be  allocated  to  the  manager  to  provide  him  with  adequate 
incentives.  The  stock  price  increases,  thus  reflecting  the  value  of  the  firm  more 
properly, due to a reduction in the tunneling of firm value to managers; the final result 
is an informational rent-extraction process by the market. 
The  essential  component  of  accountability  is  information  disclosure,  either 
mandatory  (legal,  regulatory)  or  voluntary  (self-regulatory,  spontaneous).  We 
mostly dedicate our attention to the latter aspect of accountability (of the voluntary 
type), and to disclosure patterns by the firm to the financial community (financial 
analysts, investors, shareholders) in relation to regulation and self-regulation.  
When  a  firm  goes  public  and  is  listed,  a  kind  of  contract  is  implicitly  written 
between the firm and the financial community, mediated in a certain way by the 
stock  exchange  and  by  its  rules,  this  setting  is  de  facto  a  game  of  incomplete 
information, because some aspects of the disclosure technology are proprietary to the 
agent (the firm). The information resides within the firm and it is delivered according 
to  its  disclosure  policy,  conditioned  by  law,  regulation,  stock  exchange  rules, 
conventions and so forth. Implicit in the relationship between the market and the 
firm  is  a  contract  which  is  incomplete,  since  it  fails  to  deliver  observable  and 
verifiable information on this disclosure technology by the firm. The incomplete 
contract  concerning  the  technology  of  disclosure  becomes  a  game  in  which  the 
principal does not know the agent’s type – its willingness-to-disclose (i.e., how eager 
is the firm to disclose information on its future prospects). Incomplete contracts are 
contingent  on  some  moral  hazard  or  adverse  selection  unobservable  and  latent 
variables (Laffont, Tirole 1993: 3 fn. 9): we include all of them under the heading 
‘accountability’.  By  adhering  to  self-restraints  and  customs  (i.e.,  voluntary 
disclosure), the firm signals its type.  
Having established that a broader version of corporate governance, which ends 
up in reducing also adverse selection problems, improves overall accountability to 
investors (actual and prospective), we now turn to regulation. We want to consider 
cases  in  which  there  is  a  continuous  check  by  investors  on  the  technology 
parameter (firm type), mediated by the presence of the regulator with an active role 
in screening, and in establishing a finer ranking of firms.  
 
2.2 Corporate Governance and Regulation 
 
By considering corporate governance as a problem of regulation we realize, as 
Laffont and Tirole (1993: 39-40) put it clearly, that there is a trade-off between 
effort inducement (due to moral hazard) and informational rent (due to adverse 
selection): ‘Recall that the regulator faces moral hazard and adverse selection. The 
regulator  is  unable  to  monitor  the  firm’s  effort  to  reduce  cost  and  has  less 
information than the firm about technology.’. The first goal is aimed at fixing the 
incentives to induce the firm to be efficient – to reduce its costs. Some contracts 
imposed by the regulator are more effective: fixed-price contracts make the firm 
residual claimant for its cost savings, and in this regard are very powerful. The 
second goal is aimed at inducing the firm to adopt the available technology in 
production (best practices in managing the disclosure process, in our case), so the 
regulator (and the market it represents) can extract informational rent.  
Regulation  theory  suggests  a  contract  whose  structure  is  in-between  the  two 
extremes represented by the ‘price-cap’ scheme on one side and by the ‘cost-plus’ 
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have the form of a price-cap because they want to reduce moral hazard (attention is 
given to costs of providing good corporate governance), we sustain the opportunity 
to move towards cost-plus schemes, which are more likely to reduce informational 
rent by the manager and increase market rent-extraction, thus allowing the market 
to distinguish the good from the bad type of firms. In the end, a middle-of-the-road 
incentive  contract  would  be  the  best  choice.  If  the  financial  community  is  not 
informed of (un-)favorable events to the firm, they remain at the exclusive disposal 
of  the  firm  and  informational  rent  arises,  which  is  very  sensitive  to  the 
technological  environment.  The  regulator,  acting  in  the  interests  of  the  market, 
wants to extract this kind of rent deposited in the firm; in this case a cost-plus-
fixed-fee is favoured: ‘a cost-plus contract is ideal for rent extraction’ and so it is 
beneficial to the financial community.  
The regulator’s purpose should be to induce the firm to adopt this goal tied to 
hidden information; it is more important that the firm adopts the best practices 
available (at the most favourable cost). Firms face a trade-off because disclosure is 
costly, so a self-screening device is generated according to which firms reveal their 
technological competences in information disclosure to the market.  
The  setting  being  installed,  it  needs  a  screening  procedure,  fostered  by  the 
regulator, which should represent an self-enforcing incentive scheme for the firm. 
We propose an indirect reward-punishment system, by leveraging on Merton’s idea 
(1987: 493; see infra) that in the market an additional discount rate is created by 
incomplete  information.  We  show that  by  disentangling  this  premium the  SRO 
introduces an incentive scheme analogous to a cost-plus regulatory contract, since 
a form of (indirect) rate-of-return regulation is an example of a cost-plus scheme. 
Moreover, notice that measuring consensus is a way to reveal how much noise 
trading  (De  Long  et  al.  1990)  is  present  in  the  market;  the  argument  is  not 
developed here in full due to space limits. 
The regulator might become an intermediary in disentangling that part of the rate 
of return applied by the market to evaluate the firm and in attributing it to the 
information-on-the-firm  production  function.  This  component  of  valuation, 
pertaining to market consensus, could be revealed to the community and some kind 
of informational rent extraction from the manager to the benefits of the SRO and 
market (the ultimate principal) would appear. This process will result in better-
endowed firms in terms of information disclosure (accountability) to distinguish 
themselves from worse ones, and a continuum of types should appear, individuated 
according to this ‘revealed’ discount rate. The SRO is implicitly imposing a rate-
of-return incentive scheme, because it can calculate a rough measure of Merton-
type discount rate present in the market, also with the help of analysts consensus. 
Indirectly, the SRO is extracting information rent from the good-type firm and is 
‘measuring the economy in disutility of effort associated with a better technology’ 
(Laffont, Tirole 1993: 58).  
Relative  performance  evaluation  (yardstick  competition)  is  a  well  accepted 
principle in financial markets, the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) being an 
example
3. Yardstick competition in our case is a way to induce an incentive for the 
firm  to  reveal  its  quality  in  accountability  and  disclosure.  The  stock  exchange 
should  propose  an  overall  index  of  transparency  (information  disclosure)  and 
calculate a kind of rate of return correction for the stocks, including some sort of 
evaluation by  financial analysts  and market  consensus. This information-related 
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evaluate cash flows; this part of the risk factor of the firm can be attributed to the 
probability of certain events of the firm which involve great risks (some kind of 
surprise events, even bankruptcy)
4. 
It is useful then to go back briefly to the process of price formation hinted at in 
subsection 2.1, now considered at a macro level. Extensive evidence demonstrates 
that  market  value  is  influenced  by  the  extension  of  firm’s  investor-base,  by  the 
number  and  reputation  of  the  analysts  who  release  reports  on  the  firm,  by  the 
reputation  of  the  firm  itself  in  the  financial  community.  Since  investors  have 
information only on a subset of securities, this form of incomplete information has 
an effect on equilibrium price that is ‘similar to applying an additional discount rate’ 
(Merton 1987: 493). As Merton shows, a modified-CAPM explains the neglected-
stocks  effect:  since  tracking  some  firms  is  costly  for  the  investment  bank,  the 
presence of few analysts is representative of difficulties in analyzing the stock. This 
observation should be hampered by the contrary evidence that some firms require 
more analysts because of the inner complexity of the industry: a market-level trade-
off is thus formed, that parallels the firm-level one between the inner structure of 
events inside the firm and their voluntary release by managers, mentioned above 
after Damodaran (1985).  
Both  market-level  and  firm-level  considerations  support  our  idea  that  the 
regulator could administer an evaluation process through a survey to analysts in 
order to give an overall evaluation of the disclosure policy and transparency of the 
firm;  the  regulator  acquires  an  important  role  in  yardstick  competition  by 
disentangling  purely  idiosyncratic  shocks  from  purely  aggregate  shocks,  thus 
reducing  informational  asymmetries  present  in  the  market  (see  Laffont,  Tirole 
1993: par. 1.7). 
The  screening  device  reflects  the  two-tier  structure  of  the  price  formation 
mechanism and can be articulated in a four-steps procedure around an indicator.  
At the first step, the SRO develops an index based on the code of  corporate 
governance (the Code Index) to assess with a grade the compliance of the firm to 
the Code; it would reflect micro-level price formation. A composed indicator based 
also on the law and on security regulation, called the Governance Indicator could 
include also more indices concerning norms and rules. 
At the second step, SRO collects the market consensus on corporate governance 
for each firm, by aggregating evaluations on each firm given by financial analysts 
who track the stock. By using the same evaluation forms the stock exchange uses in 
its own assessment of the Code Index, it could be detected the perception of the 
market on the adherence by each firm to the rules of the Code. A grade is given, a 
kind of average evaluation ‘from the floor’ (at macro-level), which can closely track 
the  grade  obtained  by  the  stock  exchange  itself:  this  is  a  first  indication  from 
financial analysts concerning the way the firm is perceived to respect the rules. The 
index from the second step can be called the Code Consensus. (Actually it could be 
the Governance Consensus, as above, if the indicator includes evaluation the Code 
and also on norms and regulation rules.)  
The third step is characterized by an enlarged stream of variables of interest, as 
far  as  corporate  disclosure  is  concerned,  not  included  in  the  Code.  This  index 
includes  variables  such  as  the  propensity  to  respond  to  questions  concerning 
strategies in meetings with the financial analysts and other variables deemed of 
relevance  to  them.  Again,  questionnaires  are  circulated  (for  each  firm)  among 
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give an overall reputation of the firm in the market, it can be called the Reputation 
Consensus. 
At  a  final,  fourth  step,  the  stock  exchange  could  eventually  present  a  final 
indicator  mixing  or  adjusting  the  Code  (or  the  Governance)  Indicator  with  the 
Reputation Consensus, using the appropriate weights. 
 
 
3. An Index Based on Corporate Governance Code 
 
Recent legislative reform in Italy, effective from 2004, has allowed firms to shop 
around three ‘models’ of corporate governance: the Latin (pre-existent), the Anglo-
Saxon (or monistic) and the German (or dualistic); they are considered equivalent 
options  available  to  shareholders.  It  is  interesting  to  notice  that  the  Corporate 
Governance  Code  (Borsa  Italiana,  2002),  a  self-regulation  device  introduced  in 
1999  and  revised  in  2002  under  the  auspices  of  the  stock  exchange  included 
provisions which have been pasted into this new legislation. 
We argue that the possibility of shopping among models is not a discriminating 
criterion to detect the quality of corporate governance of a single firm, but should 
be  considered  as  some  kind  of  conditioning  variable  for  more  voluntary  and 
discretional compliance by firms. We lack benchmarks or references to compare 
the three models: inside our country we cannot use the adopted model as a signal of 
corporate governance quality. Once the legal model has been adopted, firms need 
more freedom in order to build up their reputation and credibility with the market: 
self-regulation could furnish a finer scale of options along which firms can position 
themselves to signal their quality.  
Recent trend towards more precise and well-defined norms does not take into 
account  that  self-regulation  could  both  improve  the  strategic  levers  firms  can 
manoeuvre in order to signal their quality in corporate governance and at the same 
time  guarantee  more  up-to-date  adjustment  to  current  needs  of  the  market,  to 
developments in theory and in best practices.  
We  present  the  framework  for  a  quantitative  indicator  based  on  functional  and 
technical quality to be applied to each legal model chosen by an Italian firm; the tool 
would be periodically revised to follow best practices: it represents an enhancement to 
market efficiency and a strategic tool for management. While waiting for a revision of 
the so called Preda Code after the aforementioned introduction of new legislation, we 
develop the indicator on the actual Code in its 2002 version. 
Practitioners (rating agencies, consulting firms) and scholars are trying to define 
corporate  governance  rating  tools:  these  proposals  individuate  an  ideal  set  of 
corporate governance features in order to create an indicator that could be used for 
every  firm  whatever  the  business  and  the  country  of  operations.  Many  of  these 
indicators are based on the OECD principles on corporate governance (2004) and 
deal with six different areas: ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance 
framework; the rights of shareholders and key ownership functions; the equitable 
treatment  of  shareholders;  the  role  of  stakeholders  in  corporate  governance; 
disclosure and transparency; the responsibilities of the Board.  
Indices can be used to forecast performance. Koehn and Ueng (forthcoming) cite 
several studies on best  practices that  encourage investors (especially  institutional 
ones) to ‘believe that best board practices are likely to benefit shareholders over the 
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governance metric systems that purport to reveal exactly how sound a particular 
company’s governance is’. In their work they test two statistical hypothesis in order 
to understand if these metrics are  good predictors of earnings quality  and ethics 
(which in turn are considered the two essential features of a firm’s best practice in 
management).  They  cite  two  main  corporate  governance  metric  systems: 
Governance  Metrics  International  (GMI)
5  and  Institutional  Shareholder  Service 
(ISS)
6; they conclude that GMI is not positively correlated to earning quality and 
ethics and choose the second one for the purpose of their study. 
Gompers et al. (2003) present a Governance Index (GI) based on restrictions on 
shareholder rights (i.e., increased managerial power) that ‘only consider the impact 
on the balance of power’
7. 
All  of  the  tools  just  mentioned  (GMI,  ISS,  GI)  could  be  used  by  prospective 
shareholders wanting to invest in a country. According to GMI and ISS their ratings 
could  be  used  to  compare  companies  across  countries,  because  they  individuate 
universal dimensions always to be considered in corporate governance matters. We 
disagree with the underlying idea of this approach that an ideal corporate governance 
system exists, towards which every firm has to strive, and with the statement that 
indicators can be used in across-countries comparisons.  
First  of  all  we  have  to  take  into  account  the  differences  in  legal  origins  of 
corporate governance laws, as La Porta et al. (1998: 3-4) have demonstrated: ‘law 
and quality of its enforcement are potentially important determinants of what rights 
security holders have and how well these rights are protected’. In other words, it 
seems that it is important to underline how differences between legal systems in 
different countries are influenced by the country history and culture, because it 
could ‘shed light on these corporate governance puzzles’.  
We think that GMI and ISS (the GI is actually a domestic one) could underestimate 
the  importance  of  legal  systems  influences  on  governance  practice:  they  do  not 
properly consider that every legal system concerning corporate laws is a mixture of the 
influences of different legal families. Moreover, none of them considers that it is at 
least possible to identify the origin of a legal system, in order to assign it to a legal 
family and consequently modify the score to take into account of this aspect. This is 
why it is important to consider the country legal system as something fixed (some kind 
a conditioning variable, in a sense) and evaluate business culture when dealing with 
the creation of a corporate governance rating system. To accomplish this scope, we 
focus on corporate governance codes, because they involve different components of 
the financial community (practitioners, analysts, bankers, management scholars, law 
scholars, entrepreneurs, regulators and SROs) in the steering and technical committees, 
thus guaranteeing more up-to-date adjustment to current needs of the markets, to the 
developments in theory and in best practices, and proving more suitable in expressing 
the legal system and the business culture of the country.  
If we individuate the corporate  governance  code as a  good tool to signal the 
peculiarity of business culture and corporate best practice for each country, it is 
useful to use it in order to obtain a rating system whose score could become a 
variable to be analyzed for investor decisions.  
We focus on the Italian Code to outline a framework for the indicator-building 
process  that  could  be  easily  adopted  to  evaluate  any  country’s  corporate 
governance, thus increasing the comparability of the results obtained. We support 
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service-quality  evaluation  system,  and  this  is  the  only  common  ground  across 
countries: the conceptual framework and methodology they share. 
In order to create the index we refer to the statistical quality evaluation literature 
(Grönroos 1990): we consider corporate governance as a service and we evaluate 
its quality. In our case the service is information disclosure, that reduces the level 
of moral hazard and adverse selection risk.  
Grönroos shows that quality is what is perceived by the clients, so it is fundamental 
to express corporate  governance in terms of process in order to evaluate it  as  a 
service  and  to  measure  its  quality.  He  distinguishes  two  different  dimension  of 
service quality: technical and functional quality; the former is related to the results 
and measures what the customer obtains; the latter refers to the process that allows a 
proper service deliver, thus obtaining the result that the customer desires.  
In our case we have a process (the information-production function of the firm) and 
a  result  (corporate  governance,  the  disclosure)  that  allows  the  customers 
(stakeholders:  the  financial  community)  to  obtain  what  they  desire  (proper 
accountability).  We  consider  technical  and  functional  quality  of  corporate 
governance  bodies  (e.g.,  board,  auditing  committee,  others)  and  processes  (e.g., 
board meetings procedures, shareholders meeting rules, internal auditing committee 
procedures) in order to build the index based on the Italian Corporate Governance 
Code. Figure 3.1 summarizes our conceptual framework. 
 
Figure 3.1 The CG Index Dimension 
 
Procedures   ￿￿ Functional quality (how)   ￿| 
              |   
    |￿ Corporate Governance quality 
Features and composition           | 
of CG bodies   ￿￿ Technical quality (what)   ￿| 
 
 
Source: Grönroos (1990), with modifications 
 
We define technical quality in a slightly different way from Grönroos in order 
to take into account the specificity of corporate governance mechanism: since the 
desired result of a service depends on its component parts, we consider the quality 
of corporate governance bodies, whose elements are: the number of independent 
board members, the presence of internal committees, the existence of specific rules 
for appointment of board members or for shareholders’ meetings.  
Each  one  of  these  components  is  evaluated  by  itself  and  so  are  the  dynamic 
relations that arise among them. These processes are considered under the functional 
quality dimension that concerns the features of the corporate governance process and 
the way in which the corporate governance bodies interrelate. 
In table 3.1 we present the variables considered for the index (specifying their 
functional or technical quality dimension) and obtained from the Italian Corporate 
Governance Code. The score for each variable is described in the second column, 
where  we  also  consider  a  weighting  hypothesis  that  could  be  used  in  order  to 
obtain a more precise score an the source of information. For some variables we 
also individuate a benchmark that indicates the best practice and that is useful in 

















Board  meeting  are  periodically  held 
and are effective 
(Functional) 
The benchmark is once per month. The minimum score per year is twelve. Every 
meeting  scores  one  point  and  is  weighted  according  to  the  importance  of  the 
agenda. 1 for ordinary, 0.5 for less important and 1.5 for extraordinary. 0 if it is not 
possibile  to  obtain  the  information.  The  presence  of  the  majority  of  the  board 
members also accounts as a weighting coefficient. 1 if the 50% is reached, 0.5 if 
not. (Board meetings minutes - and/or other informal sources or communications to 
the market) 
Presence  of  strategic,  financial, 
industrial plans (Functional) 
The score is one for every plan that is approved by the board  
(Board meetings minutes 
CEO or committee  
(Technical) 
The score is 1 for presence and 0 for absence  
(Board meetings minutes) 
Number  of  board  meetings  held  for 
CEO or committee report (Functional) 
The benchmark is four per year. Every meeting scores one and the overall score 
range from 0 (no meetings) to four (minimum).  
(Board meetings minutes) 
Number  of  assignments  in  other 
boards for the board members 
(Technical) 
The maximum number for listed company is 5. The score is 1 for every member of 
the board that has no more than 5 assignments.  
0.20 is subtracted for every additional assignment, so that 0 is reached when the 
overall number of assignments is 10 or more. The score obtained is divided for the 
number of board members.  
(Chamber of commerce, Borsa Italiana) 
Number  of  non  executive  board 
members  
(Technical) 
The benchmark is 3 out of 5. The score range from 0 to 1 according to the ratio 
calculated.  
(Borsa Italiana, company records) 
Number  of  independent  board 
members among the executive 
(Technical) 
The  benchmark  is  75%.  The  score  ranges  from  0  to  1  according  to  the  ratio 
calculated. The definition of independent member is taken from the code.  
(Borsa Italiana, company records, members survey) 
The board members are well informed 
before every board meeting  
(Functional) 
A report on every topic on the agenda is sent to the board member at least five days 
before the meeting. A signature of the board member on a copy of the report could 
prove the delivery. 
(1) 
The score is one if every member had the report, 0.5 if at least the majority had the 
report, 0 if a minority had the report.  
(Board meeting minutes) 
Board rules to deal confidential inform 
(2) (Functional) 
The score is 1 for presence and 0 for absence  
(Board meetings minutes) 
Board rules to appoint board members 
(Technical) 
The score is 1 for presence and 0 for absence  
(Board meetings minutes) 
Internal  committee  to  appoint  board 
members 
(Functional) 
The score is 1 for presence and 0 for absence. The score is weighted with the 
presence of independent members in the committee. The weight is 1 if the majority 
of committee members are independent and 0.5 if there is a minority  
(Board meetings minutes) 
Internal committee for board members 
remuneration 
(Functional) 
The score is 1 for presence and 0 for absence. The score is weighted with the 
presence of independent members in the committee. The weight is 1 if the majority 
of committee members are independent and 0.5 if there is a minority 
(Board meetings minutes) 
Part  of  the  board  remuneration  is 
linked to performance 
(Functional) 
The score is one if at least ½ of the remuneration is linked to performance, it is 0 in 
other cases 
(Board meetings minutes, remuneration committee minutes) 
Internal  committee  for  internal  audit 
procedures 
(Technical) 
The score is 1 for presence and 0 for absence. The score is weighted with the 
presence of independent members in the committee. The weight is 1 if the majority 
of committee members are independent and 0.5 if there is a minority 
(Board meetings minutes) 
Number of board meetings dedicated 
to  internal  audit  report  from  the 
committee and procedures revise 
(Functional) 
The benchmark is two per year. The score is 0 if there is none, 0.5 if there is only 
one and 1 for two meetings per year 
(Board meetings minutes) 
Number  of  internal  audit  committee 
meetings  with  external  auditors 
(Functional) 
The benchmark is two per year. The score is 0 if there is none, 0.5 if there is only 
one and 1 for two meetings per year 
(Audit committee minutes) 
Board  rules  for  the  relations  with 
linked company (Functional) 
The score is 1 for presence and 0 for absence 
(Board meetings minutes) 
A  board  member  or  committee  is  in 
charge for the keeping relations with 
relevant  stakeh.  (institutional 
investors,  minority  shareh.) 
(Techincal) 
The score is 1 for presence and 0 for absence 
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Number  of  stakeholder  relations 
committee  meetings  with  the 
counterpart 
(Functional) 
The benchmark is two per year. The score is 0 if there is none, 0.5 if there is only 
one and 1 for two meetings per year 
(Committee minutes) 
Company  rules  for  shareh.  general 
meeting. 
(3) (Technical) 
The score is 1 for presence and 0 for absence 
(Company charter) 
Shareh. has withdrawal right in case of 
important  variation  in  accounting 
value,  composition  and  number  of 
shareholders. (Functional)  
The score is 1 for presence and 0 for absence 
(Company charter) 
Internal  committee  for  the 
appointment  of  statutory  auditors  by 
the shareholders 
(Functional) 
The score is 1 for the presence and 0 for the absence. The score is weighted with 
the presence of independent members in the committee. The weight is 1 if the 
majority of committee members are independent and 0.5 if there is a minority  
(Board meetings minutes) 
 
Notes to table 3.1  
(1) For the variable ‘The board members are well informed before every board meeting’. There is not a reasonable way to 
verify this procedure and this could be a serious problem, due to confidential information. 
(2) For the variable ‘Board rules for the management of confidential information’. We do not consider insider dealing aspects 
here, only because we want to preserve the link with the Code: it considers only ‘confidential information’ in general. 
(3) For the variable ‘Company rules for the shareholder general meeting’. Here another indicator could be developed because 
general features of the shareholders’ meeting are already fixed by some listed companies. 
 
We realize that the weights could be obtained  by statistical methods, but our 
intent at the moment is mainly to individuate the variables derived from the Italian 
code and to describe how these variables could account for the index overall score. 
They could be also considered in a benchmark established by the regulator or the 
SRO  in  order  to  set  different  priorities  for  different  aspects  of  good  corporate 
governance  practices.  In  the  Italian  case  the  stock  exchange  has  maintained  a 
separation  of  segments  of  the  market,  according  to  which  the  listing  on  one 
segment implies more quality in corporate governance compliance. In that case the 
weights could be assigned in order to differentiate the listed companies that belong 
to different segments and to set the standards of access. 
We closely follow the specifications of the Italian Code and we suggest the score 
of some of variables in order to define what has to have more weight on the overall 
score. We are aware that some of the variables could be redundant (collinear) when 
we consider also charter rules imposed by law but we want to preserve a strict link 
to  the  Code  in  its  actual  version,  to  be  updated  after  the  recent  reform.  These 
embellishments are left for further study. 
The index is built as an additive model and we can obtain an overall grade and 
the scores for each dimension (technical and functional). 
By referring to quality-evaluation process and to the described dimensions we 
obtain a tool to improve upon the three indicators described above: this process is a 
good way to take into account differences in the legal systems among countries, 
thus improving the efficiency of the tools. Gompers et al. (2003) take into account 
the  legal  system  by  considering  anti  take-over  laws  in  their  indicator,  thus 
focussing only on a part of the framework that influences a corporate governance 
system. Our indicator could refine theirs because each code is capable of catching 
the legal system influences in a more precise way.  
In  our  case  the  presence  of  technical  dimension  allows  us  to  include  in  the 
information  relevant  for  investors,  an  improvement  to  the  GMI  rating  system 
which  does  not  includes  this  information  in  the  overall  score,  with  a  reduced 
signalling performance. Moreover, by weighting the variables and the features of 
institutional components, the tool could be more precise if used to evaluate firms. 
The  distinction  between  technical  and  functional  quality  could  also  help  in 
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As expressed at the end of section 2, another index could be used to correct the 
corporate governance rating. According to Grönroos corporate image is the lens 
that corrects the service quality before it is perceived by the customer. In that sense 
analyst consensus could be considered as a proxy for the reputation and credibility 
of the firm, thus representing the lens that effects the firm’s corporate governance 
perception by the investors; this concept is shown in figure 3.2.  
The overall score obtained with the consensus indicator could be used together 
with the other one to obtain the final grade. It is left for further investigation if it 
must be added or multiplicative. 
 
Figure 3.2 The Effect of Analysts Consensus on CG Quality Perception 
 
Procedures  ￿￿ Functional quality (how)   ￿ |             | 
             |              | 
   |￿ Analysts Consensus￿ |￿ CG quality 
Features and composition          |                              | 
of CG bodies   ￿￿ Technical quality (what)    ￿|              |     
 
 




4. Conclusions: the Way Forward 
 
Our proposal concerns how to force firms to disclose, as a way to assess their 
accountability and the characteristics of their information-on-the-firm production 
function. We look for an incentive contract that induces the firm to comply, giving 
more power to a self-regulatory organization, the stock exchange itself. We end up 
suggesting a indirect form of correction to the rate of return used in the market and 
diffused by the regulator: by doing so, we disentangle a correction factor to widely 
used factor pricing models, to detect a kind of risk component of the stock implied 
by the corporate governance policy adopted by the firm.  
Our aim is to create a tool to measure corporate governance along the dimensions 
of  disclosure.  Holding  legal  origins  (or  the  model  adopted,  in  Italy)  as  fixed, 
country  codes  of  corporate  governance  can  allow  firms  to  display  their  inner 
characteristics. This preliminary version of the indicator needs testing to check the 
weighting hypotheses. La Porta et al. (1998) consider the quality of accounting 
standards (deemed a consequence of disclosure rules) but do not explicitly analyze 
disclosure rules, it would then be of particular interest to study the conjoint effect 
of these dimensions: our indicator could result in a useful complement to theirs.  
As is evident in the paper, we have not presented the dimensions of the analysts 
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Notes 
 
1 Gompers et al. (2003) build up portfolios using stocks picked up from different deciles of their 
Governance Index: by buying from the lowest decile (strongest corporate governance) and selling 
from the highest decile (worst corporate governance) they show abnormal returns of 8,5% per year 
in the sample period. Bad corporate governance is associated with lower profits, lower sales growth, 
higher capital expenditure and amount of corporate acquisitions, thus giving strong evidence of 
profound relation between corporate governance and performance.  
2 The ‘information-on-the-firm production function’ can be assimilated to the production function 
of the products sold by the firm and to other marketing-costs function (Merton 1987: 501). We can 
only briefly mention here the relevance of hidden information disclosure from the standpoint of a 
full-fledged market-driven management (Lambin and Brondoni 2000-1), especially when considered 
at a corporate level: in this case the ‘client’ is the financial community. An outstanding example is 
Fed Governor Alan Greenspan, a maestro in disclosing information on the policies that will be 
pursued: he shows a high level of efficiency and effectiveness in disclosure (i.e., a high level of 
significance at a low cost, even counting words said). The whole Fed structure is also considered an 
example of extreme reliability in information disclosure on the economy (e.g., the Beige book and 
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3 The CAPM is based on this principle since it compares the rate of return of any asset to the rate 
of return of an index which is deemed representative of the overall economy, or to a lesser extent, of 
the stock market. 
4 The idea is that it could be applied either inside revised-CAPM models such as Merton’s, which 
has been our main reference, or in other multiple-beta models, and indeed will result in a strong 
deterrent against bad corporate governance practices. 
5  The  GMI  rating  system  (www.gmiratings.com)  consists  of  six  different  categories:  board 
accountability; financial disclosure and internal controls; shareholder rights; executive compensation; 
market for control and ownership base; corporate behavior and corporate social responsibility issues. 
Each receives a score that is then added to obtain an overall grade. All companies rated by GMI are 
graded on a scale from 1.0 (lowest) to 10.0 (highest). The company ratings are calculated relative 
either to other rated companies in the same region or country of origin (the company’s ‘home market’ 
rating) or to the 3,200+ companies rated by GMI worldwide (‘global rating’). Together with this rating 
every subscriber receives a report where some additional information not considered in the index score 
is given: a rating history for both the company and its industry, summary statistics for the board of 
directors.  In  the  report  each  of  the  three  key  committees  (audit,  compensation  and 
nomination/governance)  are  profiled,  and  each  member  of  the  board,  too.  Each  director’s  profile 
includes a classification as either independent or non-independent, according to GMI guidelines and an 
explanation, when directors are classified as non-independent. These additional corporate governance 
features are not inserted in the general indicator but considered autonomously.  
6 The ISS (www.issproxy.com) bases its rating on 63 variables, including board committee structure, 
board size, number of boards on which individual director serve, board guidelines, the number of 
independent  directors,  directors’  attendance  at  the  meetings,  board  responsiveness  to  shareholder 
proposals. 
7  The  index  is  composed  of  five  categories:  delay,  protection,  voting,  State,  other.  The 
Governance Index results from the sum of the points gained for each of the 28 provisions: one for 
the existence and zero for the absence; the higher the score, the less the shareholder protection. 
 